After another dubious election victory, Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, appears firmly in power. The only real potential threat, history shows, may come if his own security forces betray him.

By Jack Nicas

Venezuela is in another dark moment.

President Nicolás Maduro, the authoritarian leader who has been in power since 2013, has declared himself the winner of another election that international observers have called undemocratic. His security forces have arrested hundreds of political opponents. And new protests against him appear to be losing steam.

Is all hope for democracy in Venezuela lost? Opposition leaders are trying to push forward, and the United States has recognized their candidate as the winner of Sunday’s vote. But Mr. Maduro does not appear close to giving up power. What, exactly, would that take?

The answer — according to analysts, political scientists and a review of history — largely depends on government security forces.

The Threat From Within

In a true democracy, politicians must win support from a majority of voters to keep power. In authoritarian regimes, dictators are often propped up by a small circle of influential figures.

“The less democratic a political system becomes, the more reliant you are on just a very small number of people to maintain power,” said Marcel Dirsus, a political scientist and author of “How Tyrants Fall.”

That means security forces — not the furious protesters on the street — pose the most serious and immediate danger to his tenure, researchers said. “The biggest threat are the men with guns,” Mr. Dirsus said.

Between 1950 and 2012, nearly two-thirds of the 473 authoritarian leaders who lost power were removed by government insiders, according to an analysis by Erica Frantz, a political science professor at Michigan State University who studies authoritarianism.

To combat that threat, autocrats frequently try what political scientists call “coup-proofing”: They divide security forces into various fragmented units. That cn keep any one branch from amassing too much power — and also cause forces to spy on one another.

That, analysts said, describes Venezuela.

Propping Up a Regime

Mr. Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, created a tangled web of military, police and intelligence agencies.

Venezuela’s armed forces, with approximately 150,000 members, are split between the army, navy, air force and national guard.

There is a national police force and a national militia — partly made up of Maduro supporters with little to no training — that can be called in to take up arms in an emergency.

There are so-called colectivos, or groups of civilians who attack protesters and, according to researchers, are armed by the government.

And there are three separate intelligence agencies, as well as intelligence units within other forces, which surveil the opposition and one another.

For years these forces have quelled protests, hounded the opposition and helped preserve Mr. Maduro’s increasingly authoritarian time in power, which has outlasted many analysts’ expectations.

“It checks all the boxes for a regime that should be vulnerable to overthrow: major economic problems, difficulties with the successor establishing legitimacy, and a narrowing of the support base,” said Ms. Frantz, who studies Venezuela and co-wrote “The Origins of Elected Strongmen.”

“The critical player in ensuring the regime stays afloat has been the security apparatus,” she said.

In turn, the government has purchased loyalty by giving senior military officers high-paying jobs or control of state industries.

Why Switch Sides?

The question then is: What would make the security forces flip?

“People need to believe there’s an actual possibility that he could fall,” Mr. Dirsus said. “Only then will the men with guns either stand aside or change sides altogether.”

In other nations, when signs have emerged that a dictator is losing power, military officers have quickly betrayed the dictator to protect themselves. Sometimes that has meant attempting a coup. Other times it has meant aligning with the opposition.

In Brazil, the military dictatorship in power from 1964 to 1985 acquiesced to a peaceful transition to democracy in part because it had secured amnesty for officers who committed abuses. As a result, few people have ever faced legal consequences for a government that killed more than 400 people.

A few years earlier in Argentina, the military dictatorship effectively collapsed after losing the Falklands War. Courts have since convicted more than 1,100 military officials for abuses during the dictatorship, which human rights groups say killed as many as 30,000 people.

Researchers said Venezuelan forces were probably considering two such possibilities. They can stick with Mr. Maduro, potentially keeping power but also risking a collapse of the government and potential jail time. Or they can participate in a transition to democracy and negotiate immunity for any crimes.

Venezuela’s Current Moment

Given those stakes, what is happening behind the scenes in the Venezuelan government is unclear.

The opposition has made direct appeals to security forces, asking for their support to ensure the election results are respected.

“Members of the armed forces, the nation needs you,” María Corina Machado, an opposition leader, said in a video to the military before the election. “The Constitution must be your North Star and guide.”

On election night, as exit polls suggested that the opposition candidate Edmundo González had won in a landslide, three top leaders of Venezuela’s security forces struck a balanced tone in a public address.

“The people of Venezuela have gone to the streets, to their voting centers, to exercise their human right,” said Gen. Vladimir Padrino López, Mr. Maduro’s longtime defense minister, “voting for the option that each conscience dictates.”

He then said the government would release vote tallies from every polling station. It has since refused to do so.

For General Padrino López and the other officers, “it was actually a very calm narrative compared to what we’re used to,” said Andrei Serbin Pont, a Latin America security analyst who has studied Venezuela’s security forces for years.

The next day, the security forces’ response to mass protests was relatively less forceful than in the past. Fewer soldiers and police officers were on the street, and they were generally less combative with demonstrators, Mr. Serbin Pont said.

It was unclear whether that was because of an order from Mr. Maduro, a decision by the forces themselves or a general deterioration in their personnel, weapons and morale. Many had left the country. “They migrate just like anyone else,” he said.

Then, on Tuesday night, as protests raged, the military leaders held another news conference and made clear they were publicly siding with Mr. Maduro. “We are in the presence of a coup d’état forged once again by these fascist factors of the extremist right,” General Padrino López said.

If any security forces are talking to the opposition, they will desperately try to guard that secret. Venezuela’s intelligence agencies “are really good at seizing opportunities like this to weed out possible dissidents,” Mr. Serbin Pont said.

The Importance of Protest

While security forces are key to Mr. Maduro’s fate, researchers said, they can be heavily influenced by protests and international pressure.

Some foreign allies’ refusal to recognize Mr. Maduro’s self-declared victory and the U.S. recognition of his challenger as the winner could weaken his standing with the security forces. Large protests could, too.

“If they look out into the streets and see a sea of ordinary Venezuelans opposing the regime, that’s going to change their expectations about the future,” Mr. Dirsus said.

But if Venezuela wants to transition to a full democracy, nonviolent protest may also be critical.

A study by Harvard’s Erica Chenoweth showed that over the past several decades, 57 percent of nonviolent resistance campaigns around the world had led to democracy, while violent campaigns led to democracy in less than 6 percent of cases.

“The key factor for democracy in Venezuela is that — should regime change happen — things go down peacefully,” Ms. Frantz said. “When there is violence and bloodshed, the chances of a new dictatorship taking control increase substantially.”

Lucía Cholakian Herrera contributed reporting from Caracas, Venezuela.

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Jack Nicas is the Brazil bureau chief for The Times, based in Rio de Janeiro, where he leads coverage of much of South America. EnergiesNet.com does not necessarily share these views

Editor’s Note: This article was originally published by The New York Times. A version of this article appears in print on Aug. 5, 2024, Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: Assessing Likelihood Of Maduro Yielding. All comments posted and published on EnergiesNet or Petroleumworld, do not reflect either for or against the opinion expressed in the comment as an endorsement of EnergiesNet or Petroleumworld.

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EnergiesNet.com 08 05 2024

A version of this article appears in print on Aug. 5, 2024, Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: Assessing Likelihood Of Maduro Yielding.